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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, 
INC., A Utah Corporation, ll::::: ' 
Plaintiff and Appelrt, ,~ 
vs. u 
WESTERN DRILLING COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, JOSEPH BAS-
SICK, EMILY BASSICK.z ... UTILI- ___ _ 
TIES SERVICE COMPA1~Y, AM-~-·- , · 
ERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania Corporation and RICH-
FIELD COMMERCIAL AND SAV-
INGS BANK, A Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
RICHFIELD COMMERCIAL SAV-
INGS BANK, a Utah Oorporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARDT. CARDALL, THOMAS P. 
VUYK, WESTON L. BAYLES and 
MERRILL K. DA VI'S, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9620 
and 
No. 9621 
BRIEF OF AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, A 
PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
Appeal from an Order of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WESTERN DRILLING COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, JOSEPH BAS-
SICK, EMILY BASBICK, UTILI-
TIES SERVICE COMPANY, AM-
ERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania Corporation and RICH-
FIELD COMMERCIAL AND SAV-
INGS BANK, A Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
RICHFIELD COM'MERCIAL SAV-
INGS BANK, a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. CARDALL, THOMAS P. 
VUYK, WESTON L. BAYLES and 
MERRILL K. DAVIS, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9620 
and 
No. 9621 
BRIE'F OF AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, A 
PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANT AND RES'PONDENT. 
Appeal from an Order of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff brought tJhis action to recover 
$11,010.69 paid out of its trust account by defendant 
Richfield Commercial and Savings Bank, under a 
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judgment and. garnishment proceeding and an ex-
ecution based thereon, which judgment was there-
after set aside for lack of jurisdiction, or, plaintiff 
sought in the alternative to have payment of said 
sum declared a valid offset against the amounts 
owed by the plaintiff to the defendant, American 
Casualty Company, as assignee of defendants Joseph 
Bas!Sick, Emily Bassick and Utilities Service Com-
pany, defendants. 
DISPOSITIO:N" IN UOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
dismissed plaintiff's Amended. Complaint against 
defendant Richfield Commer~ial and Savings Bank, 
and denied plaih'tiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment against the defendanlt American Casualty 
Company, assignee of defendant, 'in the original pro-
ceedings. 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON. APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks a reversa:l of the order dis-
m'issing plaintiff's Amended Complaint as against 
defendant. Richfield Commercial and S'a'fings Bank, 
or, in the alternative, reversal of the order denying 
plaintiff's Motion for" Summary Judgment against 
defendant American Casualty Company. 
Defendant Ameri'can Casualty Company seeks 
to have this Court sustain the lower court's order 
denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
as aga:inst it. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To avoid needless repetition, defendant and 
respondent American Casualty Company will con-
solidate its answer to the brief of the Garkane Power 
Association, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant, and in-
sofar as this defendant deems necessary, answer 
the brief of Richfield Commercial and Savings Bank, 
Third-Party plaintiff and appellant, in this brief. 
Both the plaintiff and the third-party plaintiff 
as appellants have rather thoroughly set forth in 
their statements of fact, the circumstances out of 
which this litigation arose. Except as modified or 
expanded for purposes of argumenlt and to make 
the presentation of this defendant's argument more 
meaningful, the statements of facts as set forth in 
those briefs, will be adopted. 
The underlying judgment upon which a por-
tion of this litigation arose is founded upon a judg-
ment entered by the District Court of Salt Lake 
Coutny, U'tah, in Civil Action No. 109~23, which 
judgment was entered May 21, 1957, by default for 
$50,000.00 and ·costs of $13.60 in favor of Western 
Drilling Company and against Joseph Bass'ick, 
Danny P. Bassick, M. M. B·assick, Martin R. Bassick 
and Nicholas Bassick, as individuals and Joseph 
Bassick, Danny P. Bassick, M. M. Bassick, Martin 
R. Bassick and Nicholas Bassick d/b/a Utilities 
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Construction Company and Utilities Servi·ce Co. 
(File No. 109123). 
A sheriff's return dated June 25, 1956, states 
in part as follows: 
"STATE OF UTAH ! 
COU.NTY o:r: SALT LAKE ss. 
Sheriff's Office: 
I hereby certify and return that I re-
ceived the within and hereto annexed sum-
mons on the 25th day of June, 1956, and 
served the same upon M. M. Bassick, the 
wiijhin named defendant, personally, by de-
livering to and leaving wiJth said defendant, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a true 
copy of said summons, on the 2·5th day of 
June, 1956." 
Upon this return of summons a default certi-
fi·cate was executed on the 21st day of May, 1957, 
against all of 'the named defendants, and judgment 
was entered against them for the sum of $50,000.00 
plus -$13.60 on the same day. (See File No. 109123, 
unnumbered.) 
It was upon this underlying judgment that the 
subsequent writ of garnishment was issued and other 
garnishment proceedings which are under review 
here were based. 
The chronological order o'f the various subse-
quent proceedings are outlined in appellant Garkane 
Power Association, Inc.'s 'brief at pages 3 through 
6.' No oral testimony has been presented to the trial 
court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFE'NDANT AMERICAN CASUALTY COM-
PANY. 
POINT II. 
THE GARNISHMENT AND EXECUTION, BEING 
BASED UPON A VOID UNDERLYING JUDGMENT 
ARE LEGAL NULLITIES WHICH CAN CREATE NO 
LEGAL RIGHTS IN ANY PARTY CLAIMING THERE-
UNDER. 
(a) THE SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON M. M. 
BASSICK WAS INSUFFlCIENT TO ACQUIRE 
JURISDICTION OVER ANY OTHER DE'FENDANT 
AND THE JUDGME'NT AGAINST SUCH OTHER 
DE'FENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH SER-
VICE WAS AND IS VOID. 
(b) RULE 60 (b) U.R.C:P. DOES NOT PREVENT 
THE TRIAL COUR'T FROM SETTING ASIDE A 
JUDGMENT VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
(c) THE GARNIS'HMENT PROCEEDINGS BEI'NG 
BASED UPON A VOID JUDGMENT ARE ALSO 
VOI'D. 
ARGU'MENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DE'FENDANT AMERICAN CASUALTY COM-
PANY. 
Pl'aintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against defendant and respondent American Casu-
alty Company was filed November 24, 1961, and 
denied January 2, 1962. No oral testimony, deposi-
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tions or affidavits were presented to the Court in 
support of this Motion. Therefore, the trial court 
was left to rule upon the motion ·solely on the plead-
ings. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides that on a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
" ... the judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show tha:t there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." 
Even a cursory review of the pleadings will 
demonstrate that numerous questions remain at is-
sue between the plaintiff and this defendant. 
The pl'aintiff alleged in Paragraph 6 of his 
Amended Complaint tha;t on M'arch 27, 1960 it an-
swered a writ of garnishment as follows: 
"Construction contract not received final ap-
proval. The final amount due Utilities Service 
Co. has not been determined from the records 
available. Now about $11,010.6'9." (Tr. 2) 
In its Answer, defendant American Oasualty 
Company allege'd that at the time plaintiff answered 
the garnishment interrogatories there was no money 
due and owing Joseph Bassick, dba Utilities Service 
Company ( Tr. 33). This material issue in the case 
rem'ains as an unsupported allegation and an un-
qualified denial. Its determination must be left to 
a trial of the case. 
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As an affirmative defense defendant American 
Casualty Company alleged that when plaintiff Gar-
kane Power Association filed its answers to the 
garnishment interrogatories, there was no money 
due and owing by plaintiff to Joseph Bassick, dba 
Utilities Service Company, and further, that pay-
ment of any money to Western Drilling Company, 
at the time of the payment 'by the defendant Rich-
field Commercial and Savings Bank, was not pay-
ment of any moneys that became due and owing to 
Joseph Bassick and Utilities Service Company be-
cause of the prior assignment from Bassick, and 
Utilities Service Company to the American Casualty 
Company of any money that was or might become 
due from Garkane Power Association. The said as-
signment was received, acknowledged and known by 
the Garkane Power Association in July 1960, prior 
to the execution upon the Richfield Bank in Novem-
ber of 1960 (T. 33). 
In its reply to the counterclaim of American 
Casualty Company, Garkane Power Company al-
leges that it did not know of the assignment to 
Ameri(;an Casualty Company until approximately 
November 29, 1960. This defendant 'alleged that 
plaintiff knew or should have known of the assign-
ment prior thereto (T. 33, 35). Such presents 'an is-
sue of fact which also must await trial for determin-
ation. Further, American Casualty Company alleges 
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in its answer that any moneys pai'd by Richfield 
Commercial and Savings B·ank to Western Drilling 
Company, pursuant to the terms of the garnishment 
was money due American Casualty Company (T. 
3'3A) . The bank held certain funds in the account of 
Garkane Power Association, Inc. The garnishment 
execution did not issue to the Bank, but to the Gar-
kane Power Association, Inc. If funds were paid out 
improperly by the Bank, such is a matter to be adjust-
ed between the Bank and Garkane, and the American 
Casualty Company ·Should not be held responsible 
for a voluntary payment by the Bank to Western 
Drilling Company. Therefore this Defendant alleged 
that Garkane Power Association must look to the 
Bank for any damages it has suffered by reason of 
the wrongful payment, and not to American Casualty 
Company. 'This matter must also await determin-
ation. 
In addition, American Casualty Company al-
leged in its answer that the underlying judgment 
between Western Drilling Company and 'Utilities 
Service Company, entered May 21, 1915'7, and the 
garnishment proceedings ba:sed thereon were false, 
fraudulent and void. 'The American Ca;sualty Com-
pany is en tiltle'd to present its evidence in support 
of this allegation. 
Further, in its Reply to the Countercl'aim of 
Ameri'can Casualty Company, Garkane 'Power Asso-
ciation alleges affirma'tively that the American Cas-
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ualty Company knew of the garnishment proceed-
ings as referred to in plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint, but failed to intervene in saild proceedings 
('Tr. 35). This allegation of fact is unsupported 
by any evidence and thus cannot be rulled up as a 
m·atter of law. 
All of the foregoing issues appear as hare alle-
gations and there is no basis upon which the court 
could properly grant the plaintiff's Motion :for Sum-
mary Judgment against this defendant. There are 
genuine material issues of fact which must await 
completion of further discovery 'procedures or a de-
velopment of the allegations upon a trial of the case. 
The ttial court properly denied plain1tiff's Motion 
for Summ·ary Judgment. The plaintiff's lack of con-
viction in the merits of its appeal on this issue is 
demonstrated by the fa~t that its brief is devoi'd 
of any argument in support of 1~he alleged erroneous 
ruling. 
"'A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which 
when viewed 'in the light most favorable to 
the loser shows that, 'there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and tha!t the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law'. Such showing must preclude all reas-
onable possibil'i ty that the loser could, if given 
a trial, produce evidence whi~h would reason-
ably sustain a judgmen1t in his favor." 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 'P. 2d, 559, 661. See also 
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D.A.V. vs. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2'd 152, 340 P. 
2d 416; In Re Williams' Estates, 10 Uta:h 2d 
83, 348 P. 2d 683, 685. 
In the recent case of Brandt vs. Springville 
Banking Company, 10 Utah 2d 350, 13'53 P. 2d 460, 
this court observed that ·since a summary judgment 
prevents the litigants from fully presenting their 
case to the court, courts are and should be reluctant 
to invoke this remedy. 
In any event, the alleged conditions of liability 
of tnis defendant have not been fulfilleld and there-
fore Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment under 
any ·circumstances. 
Based upon the law and the facts present in 
tHis case, it is submitted th'at the court properly 
denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against this defendant. 
POINT l'I. 
THE GARNISHMENT AND EXECUTION, BEING 
BASED UPON A VOID UNDERLYING g-UDGMENT 
ARE LEGAL N·ULLITIES WHICH CAN CREATE NO 
LEGAL RIGH'TS IN ANY PARTY CLAIMING THERE-
UNDER. 
Pla:intiff alleges under Point II of its brief that 
the garnishment and execution were of no force or 
effect because they were based upon a void under-
lying judgment; namely, Western Drilling Com-
pany, Plaintiff vs. Joseph Bassick, et al., Deferulr 
ants, Civil Case No. 109123 (p. 8). This defendant 
supports appel'lant's statement of the law as it ap-
10 
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plies to this case and concurs in the reasoning and 
the numerous authority cited in support thereof. 
Richfield Commercial and Savings Bank, Respondent 
and Appellant denies the invalidity of the judgment 
(Point I, Brief of Richfield Commercial and Sav-
ings ·Bank. Appellant-Responden1t, p. 8). Respondent 
American Casualty Company will be directly af-
fected by a ruling on tllis question. Plaintiff and 
Appellant seeks recovery of $11,010.69 from Rich-
field Commerci'al and Savings Bank, or ''in the alter-
native and in the event judgment against defendant 
Western Drilling Company cannot be obtained and 
satisfied, then for a determination that illle amount 
so paid W e'stern Drilling Comrpany 'i's a valid and 
legal setoff against any amounts owed by plaintiff 
(and Appellant) to Joseph B·assick and Emily Bas-
sick or American Casualty Company" under an as-
signment · ( T. 4) . The Richfield Commercial and 
SaVings Bank contends that the underlying judg-
ment created legal rights in it sufficient to protect 
it from liability in paying $11,010.69 to Western 
Drilling Company under a garnishment execution. 
If this position is sustained, Plaintiff Garkane 
Power Association, Inc. will be denied recovery on 
its Amended Complaint against the Bank and De-
fendant American Casualty Company may be af-
fected on its counterclaim. Therefore, this defendant 
deems it necessary to supplement the discussion of 
11 
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the law as contained in Point II of Plaintiff and 
Appellant's Brief, Garkane Power Association, Inc., 
and to state its position with additional authority, 
and to reply to certain allegations contained in the 
Brief of Richfield Commercial and Savings Bank 
as ;THird-Party Plaintiff, Appellant-Respondent. 
(a) THE SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON M. M. 
BAS'SICK WAS INSUFFlCIENT TO ACQUIRE 
JURISDICTION OVER ANY OTHER DE'"FENDANT 
AND THE JUDGME'NT AGAINST SUCH OTHER 
DEFENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH SER-
VICE WAS AND IS VOID. 
As previously noted, the default judgment in 
Civil Action 109123 was based upon a service of 
process made only upon M. M. Bassick, individually. 
Service of process was never made upon Utilities 
Service Company or any of the other. named de-
fendants. (Return of Summons, File No. 109123). 
The law is clear that service of process upon 
an indivi'dual, without more being indicated by the 
return of summons, is insufficient to give the court 
personal jurisdiction over a partnership or associa-
tion of which the individual may be a member. The 
caption of the complaint in Civil Action 109123 is 
of particular significance. Western Drilling Com-
pany is named as a plaintiff. Five individuals 
are designated as individual defendants, and 
then the same individuals are identified as a busi-
ness association known as the Utili ties Construction 
12 
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Company and Utilities Service Company (See File 
No. 109123) . The HReturn of Summons" indicates 
that only one summons was served upon M. M. Bas-
sick, and that as an individual. The plaintiff, by 
identifying each defendant in two capacities, as an 
individual and as a business association, plainly in-
dicated its intention to sue each in two capacities. 
This intention is confirmed by the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 2 of the com1plaint whi'ch reads 
as follows: 
"Defendants are all brothers and have 
been 'associated in various joint ventures in-
dividually and for themselves an'd also under 
the fictitious name of Utilities Construc~ion 
Company and the Utili ties Service Company 
of Idaho and Utah." 
A partnership is not alleged, even if 'intended, and 
authority to receive service of summons on behalf 
of the 'association, even had one been served upon 
M. M. Bassick in his alleged association capacity, 
cannot be presumed. The trial court did not acquire 
jurisdiction over the other individual 'defendants or 
over the association and the trial court properly 
set the judgment aside by quashing the Summons 
on Return as to all defendants except M. M. Bassick, 
individually. 
This court has held that an aJssociation of in-
dividuals doing business together in a common name 
is an artificial person having separate legal exist-
13 
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ance and an execution issued on a judgment running 
against the association only is absolutely void in-
sofar as it purports to be against tJhe individuals. 
Hamner vs. Ballentyne, 16 Utah 4'36, 52 P. 770. 
Similarly, a judgment againslt an individual, founded 
upon personal service as to him, iiS not sufficient 
to 'base a judgment against an artificial person hav-
ing separate legal existence, and of which he hap-
pens to be a member. Although Rule 17 (d) U.R.C.P. 
provides that associates may he sued by their com-
mon name, "and any judgment obtained against 
the defendant in such case (association) shall bind 
the property of 'all the associates in the same man-
ner as if all had been named 'defendants ... ", this 
does not relieve tJhe plaintiff of first acquiring jur-
isdiction over the association, as a separate legal en-
tity, by service of process. Rule 4 (e) ( 4), U.R.C.P. 
specifies the precise manner in which personal ser-
vice must be obtained where an unincorporated as-
sociation is involved. 
A copy of the summons must be 'delivered to: 
''. . . an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or to any other agent au thori.zed by ap-
pointmen!t or by law to receive service of pro-
cess and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service 'and the statute so 
requires, by also mailing a copy to the de-
fendant. If no such officer or agent can be 
found in the county in which the action is 
brought, then upon any such officer or agent, 
or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief 
14 
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clerk, or other agent having the management, 
direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorpor-
ated association wrthin the State. If no such 
officer or agent can be found in the state, 
and the defendant has, or advertises or holds 
itself out as having, an office or place of busi-
ness in th'is state, or does business in this 
state, then upon the person doing such busi-
ness or in charge of such office or place of 
business.'' 
As will appear from the authorities hereafter 
cited, the Return on Summons, as required by Rule 
4(g) U.R.C.P., must :specify the person upon whom 
service was made and his capacity. 72 C.J.S. p. 1131. 
A review of the Return on Summons in the in-
stant case cle·arly indicates that the alleged asso-
ciation was not served With process and the Court 
did not acquire jurisdiction over it. 
The case of Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 
448, 271 P. ·31, lends assistance in the matter before 
the court. There, the plaintiff brought suit against 
three individuals, whom he alleged in the caption 
of his complaint to be doing business under the part-
nership name of Hawley, Anderson and Hinckley. 
Judgment was obtained against the three as inldi-
viduals. On appeal, the !defendants claimed that the 
action ·attempted- to be stated was one against the 
partnership, or the defendants based on a partner-
ship relation, and in such case it was necessary to 
allege in the body of the complaint the existence 
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of the partnership. . In this connection the court 
stated: 
"The only reference made in the com-
plaint to a partnership is in the caption, 'J. C. 
Hawley, 0. A. Anderson, and I. N. Hinckley, 
doing business un'der the partnership name 
of Hawley, Anderson and Hinckley, defend-
ants.' Notwithstanding such recitals in the 
caption, 1Jhe action, nevertheless, is one only 
against the defendants individually. Guthiel 
vs. Gilmer, ·27 Utah 496, 76 P. 628; Mackly 
Company vs. Meads, 14 Cal. App. 36'3, 112 
P. 19'5, 113 P. 364. As stated in the last-cited 
case, such words in the caption 'do not ~and 
cannot make the partnership a party defend-
ant in the action. The words referred to are 
merely 'descriptive - that is, they do no more 
than unnecessarHy describe or identify the 
particular persons proceeded against, in their 
individual capacities, whatever may have 'been 
the intention of the pleader in using iliem.' 
"Upon such a complaint, no judgment 
properly could have been taken against the 
partnership. 'This action must thus be regard-
ed as one against the defendants in their in-
dividua:l capacities only . . ." 
Now here is it alleged in the body of the com-
plaint, in Civil Case No. 109~3, that the individual 
parties were a partnership. In fact M. M. B·assick, 
the only individual upon whom service was made, 
is i'dentified in pargraph 4 of 1Jhe complaint as an 
employee of plaintiff. The complaint does not allege 
·a partnership, b.ut Richfield Commercial and Sav-
ings Bank assumes it and seelm to apply rules per-
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taining thereto. (Brief p. 11). However Section 
48-1-3, U.C.A. (1953) provides that ''any associa-
tion formed under any other statute of this state 
... is not a partnership under this chapter, ... " 
A presumption of partnership cannot aid the Bank's 
position here. The ·court did not acquire jurisdiction 
over the association, even were it properly made 
a party to the action. 1To the same effect see Ferry 
vs. North Pacific Stages, et al, '2'96 P. 6'79 (Cal.) 
'This rule is plainly stated in 68 C.J .S. Partner-
ship, ·§ 209, Page 683: 
"An action against ·certain named indi-
viduals as partners doing business under a 
certain firm name ~is tan action against them 
as in'dividuals, and is not an action against 
the partnership as a separate entity." 
The annotator in 7'2 C.J.S. Process, § 94 (h), 
Page 1131, reviews the law ·as follows: 
"In the case of two or more defendants 
a return of process should show clearly on 
which ones service was made, and when and 
how it was made on each; and a return show-
ing service on one, but silent as to another, 
is not sufficient to show that service was had 
on such other." 
The Sheriff's Return in the instant case, clear-
ly shows that M. M. Bassick was served as an indi-
vidual only and the judgment which was entered 
in excess of this acquired jurisdiction was abso-
lutely void and was properly set asiide upon direct 
attack by a Motion to Quash Service of Summons. 
17 
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(b) RULE 60 (b) U.R.G.P. DOES NOT PREVENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FROM SETTING ASIDE A 
JUDGMENT VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
Respondent, Richfield Commercial and Savings 
Bank, at Page 9 of its brief, argues that Rule 60 (b), 
U.R.C.P. requires that relief sought from a final 
judgment must be applied for within three months 
after the judgment is entered or taken, and that 
since the Motion to Quash Service of Summons in 
Civil Case No. 1 09'123, and the judge's order grant-
ing that Motion occurred more than three years 
following the entry of judgment, that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. 'The rule has 
reference to the procedure of setting aside a default 
judgment where the defendant "has not been per-
sonally served" but the court has acquired a color 
of jurisdiction, and not to those cases where there 
is a total absence of it. A rule similar to Rule 60 (b) 
U.R.C.P. has been established in Utah since 1888, 
and was considered by this court l.n the case of Blyth 
and Fargo Company vs. Swenson, 15 Utah 3'4'5, 349, 
352, 353, 49 p. 1 02·7. 
The construction of Section 3256 Comp. Laws 
of Utah 1888, which is substantially equivalent to 
our present Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. was involved. That 
section permitted the court to relieve a party from 
a final judgment taken against him for mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. A part 
of the section stated as foUows : 
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"When for any cause the summons in an 
action has not been personally served on the 
defendant, the court may allow on such terms 
as may be just, such defendant or his legal 
represen ta ti ves, at any time within one year 
after the rendition of any judgment in such 
action, to answer the merits of the original 
action." 
A default judgment was entered against Swen-
son even though no service of process had been made 
upon him, and he had not appeared in the action. 
In setting aside the judgment as to him the court 
concluded: 
"A judgment against a party not served 
with process, who did not appear in person 
or by his attorney, is without any binding 
effect; and though the process against him 
may have been returned as served, or the 
record may show his appearance, if in fact he 
was not served, and did not enter his appear-
ance or authorize it to be done, he may, upon 
learning of the judgment, move the court to 
set it aside, and upon sufficient proof the 
court should grant the motion. A judgment 
in such a case, without the service of process 
or appearance, would not be due process of 
law, under the constitution of this state or 
the constitution of the United States. And 
the sale of the defendant's property by vir-
tue of an execution issued upon such a judg-
ment, if sustained, would deprive him of his 
property without due process of law. A judg-
ment appearing from the record to have been 
entered against a defendant without service 
of process or appearance is void on its face, 
and may be set aside at any time by the court. 
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It is absolutely void." (Emphasis added) 
The court after reviewing the facts held that 
the one year limitation did not apply when a judg-
ment ''is entered against a defendant without notice 
or appearance". 
"But we ·are of the opinion that the de-
fendant against whom a judgment may have 
been rendered without service of process or 
appearance may, upon learning of it after 
the expiration of the year, make his motion to 
set it aside and that fue court should grant 
him leave to answer. And if the motion in 
such ·case is made before the expiration of the 
year, and the hearing is deferred until after-
wards, the court should hear and decide the 
motion. Though a defendant should be first 
informed of 'a judgment so obtained years 
after its rendition, by the levy of an execu-
tion on his property, he would have the right 
to move the court to set it aside, and to ask 
for leave to ple·ad or answer, and upon suffi-
cient proof it would be the duty of the court 
to grant such a motion and leave. A party 
must be given an opportunity to be heard be-
fore juldgment in a case to which he is a party, 
if he so desires. He is entitled to his day in 
court.'' (Citing cases). 
The court continued and quoted with approval 
from the case of Great West Mining Co. vs. Wood-
mn,s of Alston Mining Co., 12 Colo. 46: 
"It follows as a logical result of the pro-
positions before discussed, that a judgment 
rendered without service ... is ... void and 
that all sales or other proceedings had there-
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under, are, as to all persons, irrespective of 
motives or bona fides, a!bsolute nulli'ties. A 
different rule might prevail if a judgment 
is only attacked upon the ground of fraud, 
and rights have been acquired on execution 
sales without notice of such fraud. But ab-
sence of legal notice or authorized appearance 
is jurisdictional. Without jurisdiction, no 
judgment whatever will be entered, nor rights 
acquired thereunder.'' 
The court cited other authorities with approval 
indicating that where judgments had been irregu-
larly entered because of la:ck of jurisdiction, the court 
had power to entertain and set them aside even 
though not made within the time specified by statute. 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.·P. does not restrict the in-
herent power of the court to set aside judgments 
entered without jurisdiction. A void judgment ac-
quires no sanctity by the mere passage of time. The 
underlying judgment was properly set aside as be-
ing void. 
In Griener vs. Ogden Street Railway Company, 
21 Utah 158, 60 P. 548, this court sustained the 
trial ~ourt's action of setting aside and quashing 
the return of summons as to one of the defendants 
because of improper service. The court held that a 
judgment based upon such improper service "is of 
no effect" and is "utterly void." See also Boston 
Acme Mines Development Company vs. Clawson, 66 
Utah 103, 240 P. 165, which held a Motion to Quash 
a proper direct attack upon a void judgment. 
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('c) THE GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS BEING 
BASED UPON A VOID JUDGMENT ARE ALSO 
VOI'D. 
Other courts which have considered the precise 
question before this court have determined that a 
garnishment proceeding, based upon a voiid under-
lying judgment, is also void. Typical of these cases 
is Ludvickson vs. Severy State Bank, 10'5 Kas. 225, 
182 P. 396. There an action was instituted against 
the bank for paying certain sums pursuant to .a 
garnishee judgment which was founded upon a void 
judgment. 'The following language is taken from the 
opinion of the ·court-: · · 
'·~The justice of the peace was without 
jurisdiction of the· defendants in the action 
before him; summons and garnishment was 
issued·in violation of law; and the proceedings 
thereon are void. Payment u n d e r a void 
garnishment "proceeding is no defense (cit-
ing authority). Any judgment rendered or 
other action taken by a court without juris-
diction is a nullity and open to attack collat-
er ly as well as directly." 
See a1so E gnatik vs. Riverview State Bank of Kansas 
. t 
City, 114 Kas. '105, 2'16 P. 1100, and McPhee vs. 
Gomer, 6. Co. A. 461, 41'P. 836, to the same effect. 
In the case of Lincoln-Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. 
vs. Base, 84 Ariz. 9, 3'22 P. 2d 891, the validity of 
an execution rendered on a void judgment was in-
volved. The appellant was the plaintiff in the action 
below and sued the defendant on an outstanding 
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debt. A private process server was appointed under 
the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and a return 
of service was filed wherein it was stated that the 
defendant was personally served. The defendant 
made no appearance and a default 'judgment was 
entered which gave rise to an execution an'd sheriff's 
sale of defendant's property. The defendant filed 
a Motion in the same cause to set aside the sale and 
for a restraining order, and in support thereof filed 
an affidavit stating that she was out of the State 
of Arizona at the time process was served, and that 
the lady upon whom· process was served was not 
her agent,. ·and had not·given her notice of the slim-
mons. The tri'al court found that the 'defendant was 
never properly served with summons· and complaint 
and: consequently ordered the sheriff's sale of. her 
property declared null and void. 
on• appeal the trial court was affirmed: _ .. : ; 
.. '.;; . ~"The.judgment being void, 'the execution 
issued thereon was void, and the ti tie .to the 
lands ·could. not pass to the plaintiff. Tlie gen·-
eral rule is that an execution may not issue 
upon a void judgment; an execution so issued 
is itself absolutely void, and such invalidity 
extends to acts performed thereunder. Accord-
ingly, title does not pass to a purchaser at an 
execution sale where the judgment support-
ing it is void." 
It is submitted in the instant case that juris-
diction was not obtained over the Utilities Service 
Company or any other defendant except M. M. 
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Bassick, individually, and that the default judgment 
rendered against it was absolutely voi'd. Therefore, 
no rigHts were acquired by the Bank in relying upon 
a garnishee execution based thereon. In any event 
the garnishee execution was not directed to the Bank, 
but to Garkane Power Association, Inc., and the 
payment by the Bank to Western Drilling Company 
was voluntary. 
CONCLUSION 
It is res~pectfully submitted that the trial court 
did not err in denying 'Plaintiff's motion for sum-
m'ary judgment, because material issues of fact re-
main undetermined, and in any event, the admitted 
conditions of liability of this Defendant and Res-
pondent, have not been fulfilled. Further, the under-
lying judgment is void for lack of service of process 
and any garnishmen't proceedings 1based thereon are 
void and therefore legal nullities. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
Attorneys for American Casualty Company, 
Defendant and Respondent 
515 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, 'Utah 
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